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Abstract—Even though secur ity requirements in health care
are traditionally high, most computer ized health care
applications lack sophisticated secur ity measures or  focus only
on single secur ity objectives. This paper descr ibes special
secur ity problems that ar ise when processing health care data
using public networks such as the Internet. I t proposes a
structured approach using a context-dependent access control
mechanism over  the Internet as well as other  secur ity
mechanisms to counter  the threats against the major  secur ity
objectives: confidentiality, integr ity, availability, and
accountability. The feasibility of the proposed secur ity
measures is shown through a prototype, which has been
developed in a research project focussed on secur ity in health
care.
Keywords—Health Care, Internet, Secur ity, Workflow
Management
I. INTRODUCTION
In health care a lot of data are generated that in turn will
have to be accessed from several departments of a hospital.
The information kept within the information system of a
hospital includes sensitive personal data that reveal the most
intimate aspects of an individual’s life. Therefore, it is
extremely important to regard data protection laws, privacy
regulations, and other security requirements. When design-
ing information systems for health care purposes it is an
imperative to implement appropriate access control mech-
anisms and other safeguards.
Furthermore, a tendency to use the Internet as a communi-
cations media can be observed. As the Internet is an insecure
transmission media the security requirements that must be
met by the overall system are high.
Reference [1] gives a general introduction of privacy
aspects and security measures in health care. In [2], [3], and
[4] distributed systems and networks (e.g. the Internet) in
health care are presented regarding security aspects but
focussing on confidentiality and privacy.
Unlike most approaches published today we take a
general and structured outlook on the problem and take into
account the four major security objectives: confidentiality,
integrity, availability, and accountability. These objectives
and their special meaning in health care systems are
regarded, specifically for data transmission and storage.
During the project MobiMed1 a prototype was developed
to show the feasibility of the implementation of security
mechanisms required in a web-based health care application.
This paper describes the specific security requirements in
health care environments focussing on the additional
                                                       
1 Privacy and Efficiency of Mobile Medical Systems. Further  information
about the project can be found at  http://www.ifi.unizh.ch/ikm/MobiMed/
security demands resulting from the use of the Internet as a
communications media.
The remainder is organized as follows: After describing
the security objectives and their meaning in health care in
section II, the added security requirements when using the
Internet are discussed in section III. General security
measures are described in section IV. Subsequently, in
sections V and VI, the application scenario and the imple-
mentation of the prototype are illustrated focussing on the
security measures taken. Section VII summarizes the results
achieved, while section VIII describes further research
topics.
II. GENERAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES
Generally, when talking about data security – in health
care as well as in other areas – the three objectives
confidentiality, integrity, and availability are identified. This
division dates back to 1980 and was described in [5]. In this
section we will describe these security objectives and
illustrate their specific meaning in a health care environ-
ment.
Confidentiality –  Confidentiality is defined as the state
that exists when data is held in confidence and is protected
from unauthorized disclosure. If the content of a commu-
nication is disclosed to an unauthorized person or even if the
fact that a communication between two persons took place is
made public, this is considered a loss of confidentiality.
In health care many sensitive data are processed, leading
to high requirements on the confidentiality of data. Tradi-
tionally, the need for confidentiality stems from national
data protection legislation and the professional secret of
medical staff. Most data protection laws also state that data
may only be used for the purpose they were collected for,
e.g. data collected during a medical treatment may not be
used for marketing purposes.
Integr ity – Integrity is the state that exists when data has
not been tampered with or has been computed correctly
from source data and not been exposed to accidental or
malicious alteration or destruction. Erroneous input and
fictitious additions are also considered violations of data
integrity. The demand for integrity is also included in some
data protection laws (e.g. Switzerland).
The modification (whether with malicious intent or due to
a program failure) of data stored within a health care appli-
cation may lead to a mistreatment of the respective patient
which could be hazardous to his health. In a case published
in [6] an attack on a hospital information system in
Liverpool was described. The attacker changed the data of
prescriptions. A patient was saved only because a nurse re-
checked the prescription and did not administer the
prescribed medication realizing that it was lethally toxic.
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Availability – When all required services and data can be
obtained within an acceptable period of time the system is
called available.
Data concerning a patient have to be available at any
time, to prevent loss of time in case of emergencies, since a
treatment without knowing certain medical data could harm
the patient’s health. [7] describes what may happen if the
availability of a health care system is not assured, citing the
collapse of the London Ambulance Service in October and
November 1992. Due to the overload and collapse of a new
computerized dispatching system, London was left with
partial or no ambulance cover for longer periods, which is
believed to have led to a loss of about 20 lives.
Recently, more security objectives have been identified to
better suit the needs of electronic commerce systems with all
their legal aspects. The most important one is accountability.
Accountability – If the accountability of a system is
guaranteed, every participant of a communication can be
sure that his partner is exactly the one he or she pretends to
be. This allows holding users responsible for their actions.
In health care accountability mechanisms like that are
necessary because it is important to know who performed a
certain service at a certain time. Today, manual signatures of
the responsible person ensure accountability.
III. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR DISTRIBUTED
APPLICATIONS
When transferring medical data over the Internet,
additional security requirements arise This mainly touches
the following two areas:
Secure data transfer : If data are collected at different
sites the need for data transfer arises when the data are
processed at a central location. The data transmitted might
be subject to certain risks – especially if public networks
(e.g. the Internet) are used as transportation media.
Secure data storage: If the sites of data collection and of
data processing are different, it has to be ensured that the
storage on the other side of the communication is author-
ized. This depends on data protection laws as well as the
professional secret in health care, which is embodied in the
penal legislation of many countries. Also the other security
objectives have to be regarded.
Moreover, the computers taking part in data transfer have
to meet the same security requirements as any other com-
puter used in health care. However, these have been de-
scribed thoroughly (e.g. [8] proposes nine principles of data
security for clinical information systems) and are not topic
of this paper.
In the following subsections the aspects “secure data
transfer”  and “secure data storage”  are regarded more
closely.
A. Secure Data Transfer
Additional security requirements when transferring
medical data over the Internet – organized according to the
security objectives identified in section II. – are as follows.
Confidentiality –  When data is exchanged over the
Internet it is generally accessible to everybody who has ac-
cess to the network. The main threats to confidentiality for
data on the Internet are presented in [9].
Integr ity – Data transferred over the Internet not only are
read easily but are also manipulated as easily. Even though
the data are protected against transmission errors on the
lower layers of the TCP/IP2 protocol family, intentional
damage can not be prevented as an attacker may easily re-
compute checksums to forge data [9].
Availability – To ensure a certain availability the Internet
was build redundantly. However, the current implemen-
tations of TCP/IP allow attackers to disturb the operation of
computers or parts of the network, e.g. through denial-of-
service (DoS) attacks like SYN-flooding [9]. A well-known
example of how the availability of a major part of the
Internet may be compromised is the Morris Worm Incident
of November 1988 where a self-replicating program used
design flaws of BSD-derived versions of UNIX and dis-
rupted normal Internet connectivity for days [10].
Accountability – In a distributed system especially,
problems identifying the originator of a message might
occur. On the Internet the techniques to produce a wrong IP
address of the sender’s computer are well known (so-called
IP spoofing). Moreover, the address could be changed any
time during the transmission.
B. Secure Data Storage
More security requirements arise, when collecting data at
one site and storing them centrally at another.
Confidentiality – When medical data are collected at one
site and stored at another – as presented in the scenario in
section V – the regulations of the data protection legislation
have to be followed.
In Switzerland the use of medical data for research
purposes is allowed only in specific cases that are listed in
[11]. In contrast, the security policy of the British NHS3
states that a patient in treatment implicitly agrees to the use
of his or her data for research purposes [8].
The use of anonymized data, however, is allowed under
most laws; anonymized meaning that the patient cannot be
re-identified from the data stored. We therefore conclude
that – though they have different focuses – the national data
protection legislation has to be followed, i.e. as few data as
possible have to be collected about a patient and the access
to them has to be as restricted as possible.
Integr ity – The data stored at the receiver’s side has to be
kept in a state of integrity, and the user sending these data
has to trust that they are not changed.  An attacker might use
a known system vulnerability to gain access to the system,
where he could modify data.
Additional integrity may be achieved by the use of
plausibility controls before storing.
Availability – The availability of data and services at the
storing side has to be kept up at any time, as the users in the
hospitals must have access in case any problems occur.
Recent incidents where the availability of commercial
Internet servers was disturbed are the distributed denial-of-
service attacks against Internet merchants in February 2000.
Among others the Internet bookstore amazon.com and the
                                                       
2 Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol
3 National Health Service
Internet auctioneer ebay.com could not be accessed during
several hours [12].
Accountability – The server where data is stored has to
prove to the users that it is the one it pretends to be.
Otherwise an attacker might run a denial-of-service attack,
take the regular server out of order, and pretend to be this
server – consequently receiving data not intended for it.
IV. GENERAL SECURITY MEASURES
To counter the risks described above, appropriate security
measures have to be implemented.
Protection of confidentiality – Access control mecha-
nisms, encryption techniques, or anonymization are general-
ly used to protect confidentiality. Access control mecha-
nisms grant or restrict access to data or applications on
either application or operating system layer. Encryption
techniques are used to prevent unauthorized persons from
reading data not intended for them. Anonymization means
that any reference to the concerned person is removed from
the data.
Protection of integr ity – The integrity of data (e.g.
messages) can be guaranteed by the use of cryptographic
check sums (so-called message authentication codes). A
hash value of the message is calculated and appended. The
receiver again calculates the hash value of the message. By
comparison with the sent value, transmission errors can be
detected. In connection with public-key encryption such
hash values may be used as digital signatures.
Protection of availability – Within a distributed system
the availability of the computers and the communications
media must be guaranteed. Measures to protect the avail-
ability of a system are either of organizational and technical
nature or concern the surrounding infrastructure. Organi-
zational and technical measures include:
• appropriate configuration of any hard- and software
used on the system,
• regular use of security software (such as scanners or
intrusion detection systems),
• protection of the whole system from outside attack by
using a well-configured firewall system,
• rules concerning passwords,
• back up frequencies and the secure preservation of back
up media, and
• documented procedures what to do in case of security
violations.
Measures concerning the infrastructure are e.g. the safe
placement of server systems and cables as well as measures
for fire protection.
In addition, one principle design concept of the Internet
was redundancy, i.e. the data packets may find multiple
ways from sender to recipient, so that one damaged routing
element might not disturb the whole communication chain.
Thus, redundancy increases the availability of the system.
Protection of accountability – Measures to guard the
accountability within a system are log files – where all
activity is recorded – and digital signatures together with
appropriate public-key infrastructures and certificates.
Since the confidentiality is traditionally the most impor-
tant security aspect of medical data, the main focus of the
security measures described in more detail in section VI lies
on the protection of the confidentiality of the data stored and
transmitted.
The following paragraphs depict access rights, encryption,
and certification, which are also the main security mecha-
nisms implemented in the MobiMed prototype.
A. Access Control Mechanisms
A well-known system to grant or deny access rights is the
use of role-based access control together with an access
control matrix. Such a matrix is built in a way that the
objects to be accessed (i.e. the data or the applications of the
system) are listed on one axis and the roles on the other axis.
The access rights are organized as the matrix entries. Each
user is assigned one or more roles; he or she is granted
access only if one of his or her roles has access to the
requested data.
This approach can be enhanced if not only the user’s role
but also the state of the process of work is considered when
granting or denying access rights. Hence, the access is only
granted to persons who – at a given time – need this data to
accomplish their tasks. The access control becomes depen-
dent on the context. This concept dates back to [13]; [14]
suggests granting access rights according to the context of a
business process. A necessary prerequisite the analysis and
modeling of the underlying processes. This modeling is
done using a workflow management system4. In comparison
to an access control system based purely on role-based
access matrices, this scheme offers additional protection
against insiders trying to misuse stored data.
A system using workflow states as the basis to grant
access rights was described in [16] using the ActionWork-
flow System [17].
B. Encryption
To protect data from being read by unauthorized persons,
encryption techniques can be used. Two different classes of
encryption are distinguished: symmetric and asymmetric
algorithms.
When using a symmetric algorithm both parties of a
communication have to agree beforehand on one common
key, which is used for both encrypting and decrypting the
data. Common symmetric encryption schemes are DES5 and
IDEA6. An advantage of symmetric encryption is that it is
rather fast; a disadvantage, however, is the difficult key
management as keys have to be agreed upon by each pair of
potential communication partners and to be distributed in a
secure manner.
An asymmetric algorithm demands that each user owns
his or her own pair of keys: a private key, which is kept
secret and known only by its user, and a public key, which is
published and can be accessed by everyone who wants to
communicate with the key’s owner. Those schemes are
called public-key algorithms. A well-known public-key
algorithm is RSA7. When a message is encrypted with one
of the keys, it can only be decrypted using the other key.
This feature can be used to implement confidentiality as
                                                       
4 An Overview of Workflow Management Systems is given in [15].
5 Data Encryption Standard
6 International Data Encryption Algorithm
7 named after its inventors: Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman
well as accountability: If a message has to be kept secret, it
will be encrypted using the recipient’s public key, so that
only he can decrypt it, as no-one else knows his private key.
If it has to be proven that a certain person sent a message,
she will encrypt it using her private key; everybody who
decrypts it will use her public key, thereby ensuring that it
was she who wrote the message. A disadvantage of public-
key algorithms is that they are rather slow to compute,
whereas the key management easier compared to symmetric
algorithms.
To combine the advantages of symmetric and asymmetric
algorithms, so-called hybrid techniques are used. An
asymmetric scheme is used to negotiate a symmetric session
key, which is later used to encrypt the data being sent. This
combines the simple key management of asymmetric tech-
niques and the fast encryption of the data being sent with
symmetric techniques.
A thorough description of cryptographic algorithms can
be found in [18].
C. Certification
To establish trust when using public-key crypto-systems,
it is necessary that the users are given guarantee that a
public key really belongs to the person the key is issued to.
Certificates issued by a trusted third party like a CA8 offer a
solution.
Such an authority signs the users’  keys with its own
private key, thereby certifying that the information about the
user is correct and that the public-key really belongs to the
respective user. Another user can now check the certificate
by verifying the signature, thus ensuring that the key really
belongs to its user. Of course, the CA must be a trustworthy
entity that certifies keys only after the user has identified
himself. The CA’s own public key may in turn be signed by
another CA, thereby creating either a hierarchy of CAs or a
cross-certification structure. An infrastructure where trust is
established and users can access and check other user’s keys
is called a PKI9.
Another task of a CA is the management of cryptographic
keys. More information about certification and public key
infrastructures can be found in [19]. The principles of key
management in general are described in [20].
The structure of certificates issued by CAs is standar-
dized. One important standard is the X.509 authentication
framework to support the X.500 directory services [19]. An
X.509 certificate comprises among other data a certificate
serial number, the identifier of the signature algorithm, the
certificate’s validity period, the user’s name, and the user’s
public key information. All this is signed with the CA’s
private key.
V. THE APPLICATION SCENARIO
A. The Clinical Research Cycle
The application developed during our project supports a
clinical study – a so-called Clinical Research Cycle (CRC).
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9 Public Key Infrastructure
In the scope of this study a new medication is tested on
volunteers within a hospital.
This test is carried out in four steps:
1. During the first part the test person is checked, whether
he is eligible for the study. For this end, certain
questions concerning the patient’s anamnesis, inclusion
and exclusion criteria are examined.
2. Consequently, a pre-examination is carried out record-
ing a laboratory analysis of the patient’s blood and other
tests before the patient is treated with the medication to
be tested.
3. Subsequently, the medication is administered and the
same tests as in step 2 are carried out.
4. During a post-examination a few weeks after the
medication, the same tests are carried out for a third
time.
This practice allows to analyze the impact of the medi-
cation on the patient’s health. The test results are then sent
for analysis to the pharmaceutical company who commis-
sioned the test.
Traditionally, the CRC is carried out with paper-based
questionnaires. This procedure is error-prone and tedious,
because large amounts of paper are used and the data
inserted in the questionnaires has to be re-entered manually
into an electronic system at the pharmaceutical company. In
our prototype the questionnaires are electronic – to be more
specific they have been implemented as HTML10 forms with
text areas, radio buttons, and select boxes as input options.
A sample screenshot of an input mask is shown in fig. 1.
In our scenario the data are collected at several hospitals
and are sent to a central WWW and database-server to be
stored there. No data of the CRC are kept at the hospitals.
This process is a good example for distributed processing
as the test may be carried out not only in one but in several
hospitals, e.g. to find an appropriate number of test persons.
                                                       
10 Hypertext Markup Language
Fig. 1: Screenshot of the prototype
When processing data in a distributed manner, the data
protection and security requirements arise, that are topic of
this paper.
The questionnaires of the CRC contain highly sensitive
data concerning the patient like his history of drug abuse
and mental condition. Therefore it is very important to
regard data protection regulations.
A patient volunteers to participate in the CRC. Before any
examination he explicitly consents that his data may be
stored. In this consent the patient acknowledges that his
anonymized medical data can be used for the given purpose.
Only data raised during the CRC are stored in the
prototype’s database.
B. The User Interface of the Prototype
The prototype developed during our research project
supports the execution of a CRC described in the last
subsection. This subsection briefly discusses the user inter-
face and the operational framework of the prototype.
The user interface is completely based on HTML so that
standard web browsers can be used. To use the prototype a
user has to enter the URL11 of the prototype’s web site in his
browser.
When a user logs onto the system (user name and pass-
word are required) a menu offers the following alternatives:
1. Browse the description of the underlying CRC. Both the
process and the logical and temporal order of the
questionnaires are explained.
2. Show the work list depending on the user’s role (e.g.
“doctor”  or “nurse”). Following a hyperlink in the work
list automatically opens the corresponding question-
naire. Figure 1 shows an example. Each entry in the
work list represents a patient (identified through his
initials and date of birth) and the possible steps of the
examination.
3. Browse data that already exists (from other question-
naires in the study) if access rights are granted (cf.
section VI.A).
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
In sections II, III, and IV security was examined in a very
thorough but abstract way. Practical considerations will be
the topic of this section. The implementation of the security
measures is shown according to the prototype developed in
our research project.
The architecture of the prototype is shown in fig. 2. It is a
typical client-server application. The client may be any web
browser capable of SSL12 encryption and decryption. The
server side consists of a WWW13 server, several Perl14
scripts [21], and a DBMS15. The database stores the medical
data associated with the test of the new medication and the
workflow data (more precisely the model of the underlying
process) needed for the context-dependent access control
(cf. section IV.A.). The Perl scripts act like a “glue layer”
between the WWW and the database server. The following
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12 Secure Sockets Layer
13 World Wide Web
14 Practical Extraction and Report Language
15 Database Management System
example illustrates the way the different components of the
prototype work together. A typical client request is treated
in six steps:
1. The client requests some data from the medical
database. This request is done via a special HTML
form. The data packets exchanged between browser and
server are SSL-encrypted.
2. The WWW server receives the request and forwards the
relevant entries in the HTML form to a Perl script. The
whole communication between WWW server and the
Perl script makes use of CGI16-technology.
3. The Perl script generates an SQL17 statement out of the
different entries in the HTML form, establishes an
ODBC18 connection to the database server, and trans-
fers the SQL statement to the DBMS.
4. The database server executes the SQL statement and
returns the result containing the requested data items to
the Perl script.
5. The Perl script “ translates”  the result of the SQL
statements to HTML and forwards the HTML output to
the WWW server.
6. The WWW server hands the dynamically generated
HTML page back to the browser. The data are SSL-
encrypted, again.
The server side of the application is running on a single
PC using the operating system Windows NT 4.0. The
WWW server is the Internet Information Server 4.0 and the
DBMS is SQL Server 6.5. Perl version 5 is used.
After this rather technical description of the prototype its
main security mechanisms are considered in detail.
How these mechanisms correspond to the four security
objectives – confidentiality, integrity, availability, and ac-
countability – is shown in table 1. A bullet (•) indicates that
the security mechanism implements the security objective.
A.  Workflow-based access rights
In our prototype access rights are granted according to the
state of the underlying CRC. For this a model of the process
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Fig. 2: The prototype’s architecture
has to be created. Such a model is called a workflow





• control flow, and
• data flow.
Note that the workflow specification has to be defined
before the workflow is executed. During the execution many
instances of the workflow model are generated. In our
prototype one workflow instance is created for each patient.
In the CRC the activities correspond to the questionnaires
to be filled (fig. 1 shows the activity “Do Urinalysis” ). The
data items are the information contained in the question-
naires; the participants are the three user roles “doctor” ,
“nurse” , and “pharma monitor” . The control flow deter-
mines in which sequence the activities must be executed,
whereas the data flow states which data items – already
existing – are needed to carry out a new activity.
The state of a workflow describes which activities have
been performed and which activities are ready for execution.
For better handling, the states of the CRC have been
numbered in our prototype.
The context-dependent access control is done using a
database table which consists of the four entries user role,
name of the questionnaire, state of the workflow, and the
kind of access right. For instance, (nurses, 3, urinalysis,
write) is a possible tuple in the table, i.e., a nurse has write
permission on the database table which contains the labora-
tory data of the urine of a patient, if the workflow of the
patient is in phase three of the CRC.
We use this strict means of access control to ensure the
confidentiality in our system, thus not only keeping out-
siders from viewing the data but also to restrict insiders to
use the data only when necessary, i.e. the access to the data
is as restricted as possible.
B. SSL
The CRC can be executed in different hospitals. The
Internet – a public network – is used to communicate with
the central database of the pharmaceutical company. As
stated before, the Internet is a highly insecure network.
Specific security considerations have to be made. To protect
the integrity and authenticity of data packets on the Internet
a special security protocol is used, called SSL.
SSL provides data encryption, server authentication,
message integrity, and optional client authentication for a
TCP/IP connection [23] and is located above TCP/IP and
below HTTP19 on the protocol stack. A hybrid encryption
scheme is used, typically the keys have a length of 512 bits
(asymmetric) and 40 bits (symmetric). To prove the authen-
ticity of the server (possibly of the client, too) a certificate
from a trusted third party must be obtained. For more
information about SSL see [23].
For our prototype a certificate by the Swiss CA SwissKey
was obtained, which proves that the web-server is run by a
trusted entity known to the CA.
We use SSL not only to keep the communication confi-
dential but also to prove that the server is the same it claims
to be – thus enforcing accountability within the system. The
use of SSL also enhances the integrity of the data trans-
mitted through message authentication codes.
C. Authentication
Only legitimate users are allowed to communicate with
the WWW server of the prototype. To prove their legitimi-
zation users have to provide a valid login name and pass-
word every time they start a session with the server. Both
username and password are transmitted in an encrypted way
– using the SSL connection – so that no attacker can easily
gain a username and a password by intercepting the com-
munication. Authentication is a measure to increase
confidentiality and accountability of our application.
Users should be encouraged to choose a password which
cannot be guessed easily, because an attacker gaining
knowledge of a valid user password can act on behalf of that
user [24].
D. Log Files
All user activity dealing with sensitive medical data is
logged by the application. Unsuccessful or attempted data
access is logged, too. The log file contains the following
entries:
• the name and role of the user,
• the time and date of access,
• the performed activity,
• the IP address and domain name (if available) of the
client,
• the patient identification number,
• the phase to the patient’s workflow at the access, and
• the accessed database table.
The log file can be used to provide evidence what data
was requested, accessed, or inserted by a user at a specific
time. This is used to increase the system’s accountability.
Furthermore log files can be used to do load management, if
several servers are involved, to do recovery if an unexpected
error occurred, and to fulfill certain legal documentation
requirements.
                                                       
19 Hypertext Transfer Protocol
TABLE 1:










































further security measures • • •
E. Anonymization
In a clinical trial – supported by our prototype and used in
order to facilitate a test of a contrast medium in a Swiss
hospital – no personal patient data at all is submitted to the
web-server (and consecutively to the pharmaceutical
company). The patient’s personal information is kept at the
hospital. On the server only a unique identifier is used. The
medical data cannot be matched to the person’s name and
demographic data. Therefore, all data protection require-
ments are met.
F. Further Security Measures
The data to be protected in our prototype are stored in a
central database. This database is located at a secure site
distinct from the hospitals where the test of the new medi-
cation is done. There is a physical separation of the locations
where data are raised and stored. Hence, it is very difficult
for a user to tamper with data he has already transferred to
the database.
The security of a server system as well as the applications
on the server can be tested through special security scanners.
One prominent example is the scanner distributed by
Internet Security Systems [25]. To exclude as many known
system vulnerabilities as possible, such a security scan has
been performed on the computer hosting both WWW- and
database-server – increasing the availability of the system.
Furthermore, when submitting data to the server, they are
checked for completeness, thus enhancing the integrity of
the system.
When using our prototype in practice, it is very important
to implement a system to back up data to minimize the risk
of data loss. Most database systems provide means to sup-
port data back up. If the WWW server has a high workload,
back up or stand-by servers may be necessary, too.
The use of CGI-scripts may provide opportunities to
attack the system. Special “script scanner software”  – like
Whisker – is available to check all scripts on a server for
these vulnerabilities [26]. More ideas to enhance the proto-
type’s security by implementing without the use of CGI-
scripts are described in [27].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have concentrated on security require-
ments of web-based health care applications. The main
focus has been laid on a systematical presentation of the
security objectives: confidentiality, integrity, availability,
and accountability.
These objectives have been defined, and their impli-
cations on data transfer and data storage have been shown.
The implementation of the security requirements was illus-
trated with our prototype, an Internet-based application sup-
porting the data management associated with the testing of a
new medication in a hospital. The prototype’s main security
features are SSL encryption of the communication between
client (WWW browser) and server (WWW and database
server), password authentication at the WWW server, the
use of log-files, and the so-called context-dependent access
control which yields additional protection for the sensitive
medical data in the database.
The confidentiality on the server is ensured by a sophisti-
cated access control mechanism; encryption protects the
confidentiality during the transfer of the data.
Data integr ity is provided for by plausibility checks on
the server side and by message authentication codes offered
by SSL during the transmission.
Physical protection of the server and the use of special
security software to scan the system for vulnerabilities
enhance the availability of the system.
The use of SSL and certificates, login procedures, and the
use of a log file ensure the system’s accountability.
Table 1 gives an overview of the security measures imple-
mented in the prototype and the security objectives aimed at.
To sum up, the prototype implements different security
mechanisms to counter the four major security objectives in
a multi-level security architecture.
VIII. FUTURE RESEARCH
Future research will focus on the following topics:
1. The presented security requirements and the aspects of
data transfer and data storage will be presented and ex-
tended in a structured matrix, yielding a systematic
model to organize and measure the security of distri-
buted health care applications.
2. The prototype could furthermore be extended with
digital signatures to permit the so-called “ four eyes
principle” , which is very important in health care
scenarios. To introduce digital signatures in the proto-
type, a public-key infrastructure has to be established.
Also, elaborate authentication mechanisms like smart
cards or biometric devices for authentication purposes
will be considered assuming that the necessary browser
interfaces will be provided.
3. A third research topic will be the legal requirements of
health care applications in different European countries.
A typical example is the legal status of digital signa-
tures, which varies from country to country.
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